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I COMMENTS I
Punitive Damages: Flying in the Face
of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act?
I. Introduction
Matthew Gannatti was born fourteen weeks premature, and as
a result, suffers from several disabilities.1 Along with cerebral
palsy and paralysis, Matthew, age 6, is clinically blind, nonverbal,
developmentally delayed and, at approximately twenty-four pounds,
very small for his age.2 Nevertheless, Matthew attends school and
receives a quality education. Matthew receives this education due
in part to procedural and structural changes in his school.3
Changes such as hiring special teachers and installing new walkways
and entrances have enabled him and other disabled children to
obtain publicly funded instruction. The motivating force behind
these changes stemmed from the 1975 Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA").4 This Act empowers disabled children
1. Theresa Sullivan Barger, Out of Isolation; Special Education Is Changing, and So Is
the Way Children Learn About Each Other, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 28, 1994, at Hi.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994) (formerly named the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act or "E.A.H.C.A.").
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like Matthew to take part in a regular classroom of first-graders
and exercise his right to receive a proper education.5
Yet, when schools fail to comply with the mandates of IDEA,
courts award punitive damages against the institution, and these
awards provide a windfall for the plaintiff. This Comment analyzes
both the reasons for and the implications of punitive damages
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Part II
discusses the evolution of the Act, including prior case law, the
Act's legislative history, and the pertinent provisions set forth
within the Act. Part III introduces punitive damages and the
debate surrounding punitive damage awards. Part IV depicts the
disagreement ensuing over the appropriateness of punitive damage
awards under section 1415(e)(2) of the Act and how courts may or
may not interpret appropriate relief to encompass punitive
damages. Part V provides an analysis of why punitive damages are
inconsistent with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
This section argues that punitive damages do not fall within the
spirit of the Act based on other laws that prohibit punitive
damages, the Act's statutory construction and legislative purpose,
the negative effects on innocent taxpayers, the large financial
burdens that school districts already bear, and the Supreme Court's
conservative stance on punitive damages. Part VI contends that
courts award punitive damages at the expense of quality education
for disabled children. Finally, Part VII proposes solutions to the
inequities that arise from granting punitive damages.
II. Background
A. The Early Years - Case Law Prior to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act
In 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States in the
landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education6 established the
principle that all children are guaranteed an equal educational
opportunity. The Court stated that "[iun these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
5. Id.; see also Christina Connor, Artie Rejoices in Return to School; City System Irons
Out Kinks for Disabled, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Aug. 26, 1994, at 1A. Many
schools undertake renovations in order to make the physical plant more accessible to
disabled children. These adaptations in architectural design even allow severely disabled
children to share in regular educational experiences. Id.
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
[Vol. 100:2
PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER IDEA
is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity...
is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. '
The Court stressed that quality education establishes the ground-
work for good citizenship and shapes a child into a productive
member of society.' Brown emphasized that in all probability, the
most important function of state and local governments is to
provide quality education to the children of America. 9
This emphasis on education was reinforced in Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania"0 ("PARC") and Mills
v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia."t These
decisions guaranteed the right to free publicly-supported education
for disabled children. 2 In recognizing this right, the court in
PARC held that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania could not
exclude any mentally retarded child from its public education
system.t3 The court arrived at this decision through two channels.
First, it relied upon expert testimony indicating that all mentally
retarded persons derive benefits from a program of education and
training." With the assistance of training and education, many
disabled people achieve some degree of self-care, and the earlier
such training begins, the more an individual will benefit from it. 5
Second, the court noted Pennsylvania's alleged commitment to
providing a free public education to all of its children. 6 This
education was intended to be provided for all children between the
ages of six and twenty-one years. 7 Consequently, the court
7. Id. at 493.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (holding that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
could not postpone or deny to any mentally retarded child access to a free public program
of education and training).
11. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). The parents of seven disabled children brought this
civil action to seek a declaration of rights and to enjoin the defendants from excluding their
children from the District of Columbia Public Schools and/or denying them a publicly
supported education. Id. at 868. In reviewing the circumstances, the court ruled that the
school board wrongfully denied disabled children a proper education. Id. at 870. The court
emphasized that students with disorders, whether mental or physical, should not be excluded
from a publicly supported education. Id.
12. S. REP. No. 168,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1430.
13. Pennsylvania Ass'n of Retarded Children, 334 F. Supp. at 1259.
14. Id.
15. Id.




mandated that Pennsylvania comply with its own convictions and
establish free public education for everyone, including mentally
retarded children.18 The PARC case thus marked the beginning
of a trend of placing each mentally retarded or disabled child in a
free, public program of education and training.
Only one year after the PARC decision, the court in Mills also
ruled that disabled children should not be barred from a free public
education. In this 1972 decision, the court ordered that:
No child eligible for a publicly supported education in the
District of Columbia public schools shall be excluded from a
regular public school assignment by a Rule, policy, or practice
of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia or its
agents unless such child is provided (a) adequate alternative
educational services suited to the child's needs, which may
include special education or tuition grants, and (b) a constitu-
tionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review of the
child's status, progress, and the adequacy of any educational
alternative.19
The court firmly stated that the failure of the District of Columbia
to provide such publicly supported education and training to
exceptional children deprives them of due process of law.20
Moreover, the court stated that these minor plaintiffs, who are
often poor and without the financial means to obtain private
instruction, require special protection.21 Therefore, to deny these
disadvantaged children educational opportunities equal to those
available to more affluent public school children violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.22
In ordering that all children be given equal opportunities in
education, the court rejected the arguments that claimed that the
financial burdens of accommodating disabled children would be too
great. School districts claimed that they could not afford the
requested relief unless they diverted millions of dollars from other
18. Pennsylvania Ass'n of Retarded Children, 334 F. Supp. at 1259 (noting that
placement in a special public school class is preferable to placement in any other type of
training program, including homebound instruction).
19. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878.
20. Id. at 868.
21. Id. at 870.
22. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967)'(holding that "the Equal
Protection Clause in its application to public school education - is in its full sweep a
component of due process binding on the District under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment").
[Vol. 100:2
PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER IDEA
educational services or Congress appropriated millions of dollars to
improve special education.' Nevertheless, the court rejected this
argument and held that the District of Columbia's interest in
educating these children must outweigh any interest in preserving
its financial resources.24
Fortunately, Congress responded to these claims of financial
hardship by enacting IDEA, formerly known as the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act.' This Act provided for federal
assistance and alleviated some of the monetary burdens associated
with educating disabled children.26
B. IDEA's Legislative History
In order to educate disabled children with non-disabled
children to the maximum, appropriate extent,2 7 Congress repealed
Title VI, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, on July 1,
1971, and created a separate act known as the Education of
Handicapped Act.' Part B of this Act authorized grants to the
states to assist them in initiating, improving, and expanding
programs for the education of disabled children.29 However, the
heightened awareness of the educational needs of disabled children
and the landmark court decisions of PARC and Mills produced the
need for an expanded federal fiscal role.3"
To combat the financial crisis imposed upon school districts,
Congress introduced an amendment that greatly increased the aid
to states. This 1975 reform stressed the importance of locating,
identifying, and evaluating all disabled children.3 Although
actions taken at state and national levels prior to the Act spurred
substantial progress, disabled children and their parents were still
not provided with adequate funds for a free and appropriate public
23. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875.
24. Id. at 875-76.
25. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994). Under 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a), the chapter may be cited
as the "Individuals with Disabilities Education Act."
26. Id.
27. The Act envisioned the removal of disabled children from the regular educational
environment only when the nature of the disability was such that the utilization of
supplementary services and aids could not be achieved satisfactorily. S. REP. No. 168, supra
note 12, at 1498.






education.32 Congress acknowledged that the failure to meet a
child's educational needs resulted in dependent, nonproductive
members of society whom public agencies and taxpayers would
eventually support.33 Therefore, the reform focused on establish-
ing educational services that increased a child's independence. By
providing such educational services, Congress hoped to guard
against persons needlessly being forced into institutional settings.
34
In order to foster a disabled child's education and eventual
independence, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act was
designed to meet the following goals: (1) to focus the distribution
of funds to the states based on an incentive formula; (2) to assure
a priority in delivery of services to disabled children most in need;
(3) to place an emphasis on providing early identification and
assessment; (4) to provide and reinforce procedural protections for
parents and children in all matters associated with the educational
process; and (5) to solve erroneous classification and labeling of
children by setting a limitation on the number of children who may
be counted as eligible, strengthening procedural guarantees,
providing both a mechanism for compliance evaluations and a
channel for investigation of complaints.35  Within these confines,
the Act was intended to provide a free and appropriate education
at public expense. The free and appropriate education would
include the active involvement of the parents or guardians,
36
individualized planning conferences37 held frequently throughout
the year,38 and the broadening of programs to encompass cultural
and physical education.39 Congress's intention was "not that the
Act displace the primacy of states in the field of education, but that
states receive funds to assist them in extending their educational
systems to the [disabled]."'
32. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 12, at 1432. At the time the Act was considered and
approved, only 3.9 of more than eight million children (between birth and twenty-one years
of age) with conditions requiring special education were receiving an appropriate education.
Id.
33. Id. at 1433.
34. Id. The parents of disabled children should not be forced to believe that their
children will not be able to lead meaningful lives. Id.
35. Id. at 1437-38.
36. Id. at 1434.
37. Individualized planning conferences develop, review, and, when appropriate, revise
the services provided for each disabled child. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 12, at 1435.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1436-37.
40. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982).
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However, these federal funds available under the Act were by
no means to be used for anything other than the education of
disabled children.41 Forty percent of the funds were to be distrib-
uted to local educational agencies within the state in direct propor-
tion to the number of disabled children in need of a free and
appropriate education.42 The remaining sixty percent of the funds
were to be distributed in a method consistent with priorities of
granting a free and appropriate education. 3 These funds were to
be distributed first to disabled children not receiving an education,
and second to disabled children who were receiving an inadequate
education.'
Today, these notions still prevail. The law currently states that
the purpose of this chapter is to assure that all children with
disabilities have available to them a "free [and] appropriate public
education."45 Such a program highlights special education and
related services designed to meet a child's unique needs. The
program guarantees that the rights of the children and their parents
or guardians are protected, assists states and localities in providing
education for all disabled children, and assesses and assures the
effectiveness of efforts to educate children with disabilities.' In
order to secure these rights, however, Congress instituted procedur-
al safeguards that provide citizens private causes of action against
noncomplying schools.
41. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 12, at 1456.
42. Id. at 1428.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) provides that:
The term "free appropriate public education" means special education and related
services that -
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction,
and without charge,
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education
in the State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program
required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18).
46. Id. § 1400(c). The modus operandi of the Act is the "individualized education
program" or "I.E.P." School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ. of Mass., 471
U.S. 359, 368 (1985). An I.E.P. comprehensively delineates the educational needs of a
disabled child and requires that special instruction and related services should be employed
to satisfy the unique needs of the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20).
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C Procedural Safeguards of IDEA - Section 1415
Section 1415(a) mandates that any state or local educational
agency and any intermediate educational unit that receives
assistance shall establish and maintain certain procedures. 47 The
implementation of these procedures assures that children with
disabilities and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedur-
al safeguards with respect to obtaining and maintaining a free and
appropriate education. These procedural safeguards include
allowing parents or guardians an opportunity to examine relevant
records pertaining to their child's evaluation and educational
placement,49 and a chance to present complaints with respect to any
matter related to the child's education."
Another procedural safeguard provided by section 1415
includes an individual's right to sue a school for violations or non-
compliance with IDEA." Section 1415(e)(2), entitled "Civil
Action: Jurisdiction," maintains in pertinent part that:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by a
state educational agency]. . . shall have the right to bring a civil
action with respect to the complaint.. . . In any action brought
under this paragraph, the court shall receive the records of the
administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the
request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponder-
ance of the evidence, shall grant sich relief as the court deter-
mines is appropriate.5 2
In creating a potential cause of action against a school district or
school board for violations of IDEA, Congress specified in this
section that courts may grant relief as is deemed appropriate. Yet,
Congress failed to define, with any precision, the meaning of
appropriate relief.53 With the exception of attorney's fees in
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 1415(b)(1)(A).
50. Id. § 1415(b)(1)(E).
51. Id. § 1415(e)(2). In order for a United States district court to have subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to this section, the administrative process must have administered a final
decision. Id. § 1415(e)(1).
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (emphasis added).
53. See id.
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section 1415(e)(4)(B), 4 Congress refrained from fashioning an
itemized list regarding constitutes appropriate relief.
This lack of legislative guidance produces confusion as to the
type of awards that may be granted, particularly with respect to
punitive damages. While the Supreme Court has ruled that a court
possesses broad powers in awarding appropriate relief under
section 1415(e)(2), 5 the court has not specifically addressed
punitive damages. This ambiguity 6 inevitably leads to conflicts
among courts. To fully understand the implications of awarding
punitive damages under IDEA, we must first turn to a general
discussion of punitive damages.
III. Punitive Damages Generally
A. Introduction to Punitive Damages
While this Comment does not attempt to provide a compre-
hensive study of punitive damages, a basic understanding of
punitive damages is required to appreciate the need to prohibit
such damages under IDEA. First, courts generally intend for
punitive damages to supplement compensatory or nominal
damages, and punish or deter defendants found guilty of miscon-
duct57 with a malicious, reckless or otherwise wrongful state of
mind." While called punitive, these damages sometimes serve the
non-punitive purpose of augmenting damages 9 and merely
increase the amount of a plaintiff's award. Therefore, except as
specifically provided in statutory provisions, several courts have
rejected punitive damages as a form of civil punishment.'
Nevertheless, federal courts and courts in the majority of states
approve punitive damages as extra-compensatory awards.61 Even
though this is viewed as quasi-criminal punishment in a civil suit,
54. Id. § 1415(e)(4)(B) (providing that "[i]n any action or proceeding brought under this
subsection, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorney's fees as part of the
costs to the parents or guardian of child or youth with a disability who is the prevailing
party").
55. School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369-71
(1985) (allowing parents to be reimbursed for expenses incurred at a private school when the
public school had failed to provide an appropriate educational program).
56. See infra part IV.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).






courts permit this windfall to the plaintiff on the grounds that it
secures public welfare.62
Traditionally, punitive damages have been determined
pursuant to the jury's discretion and subjected to judicial review
only when the verdicts were excessive.63 The judiciary effectively
refrained from post-trial reviews and administered jury instructions
without much attention. Additionally, courts failed to uniformly
award punitive damages; thus, the size of exemplary damages
varied anywhere from a few dollars to millions of dollars.' After
1980, the outbreak of punitive damage awards was curtailed as a
result of courts' and legislatures' implementing limits on both
punitive damages and the jury's role in determining them.65 Some
states even precluded juries from determining punitive damages
altogether.66 Nevertheless, despite reforms in the system, punitive
damages continue to invoke attacks on their propriety.67
Some of this attack is attributed to the lack of a precise rule
for calculating punitive damages.' Although some courts award
punitive damages as a percentage of compensatory damages, such
rules are discounted in their entirety or reduced to a mere guide-
line.69 Therefore, juries still possess extensive powers in determin-
ing the amount of punitive damages that may be awarded.
While punitive damage awards are currently increasing in
frequency and magnitude, critics condemn punitive damages for
their obvious unfairness and economic inefficiencies.7' In terms
of fairness, the critics maintain that the standard of liability should
62. Id. (citing Loughry v. Lincoln First Bank, 494 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 1986)).





68. DOBBS, supra note 58, § 3.11(1) (citing Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris
Indus. of Vermont, Inc., 845 F.2d 404, 410 (2d Cir. 1988), affd, 492 U.S. 257 (1989)
(Vermont refused to enforce an arbitrary ratio for determining punitive damages.); Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 769 F.2d 1451, 1466 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1104 (1986)
(Oklahoma allowed punitive damages to be in proportion to a defendant's wealth and not
necessarily in proportion to the actual damages awarded.); Ryan v. Arneson, 422 N.W.2d
491, 496 (Iowa 1988) (focusing on correlation between punitive damages and wrongful
conduct, not between punitive damages and actual damages)).
69. DOBBS, supra note 58, § 3.11(1).
70. Id. § 3.11(15).
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be more uniform,71 a cap should be placed on such damages,72
and plaintiffs should not profit from the defendant's misconduct.73
In terms of efficiency, critics argue that punitive damages
either overdeter, underdeter, or possess no deterrent effect at all.
74
For example, over-deterrence occurs when a manufacturer who
withdraws a product for fear of any punitive liabilities deprives the
market of the product's potential benefits. 75 Uncertainty as to the
amount of punitive damages contributes to either over- or under-
deterrence and economic inefficiency.76  As a result, punitive
damages inspire serious debates over their usefulness and propriety
in many areas of the law.
This debate even transcends into the appropriateness of
punitive damages for violations of IDEA. Critics of punitive
damages claim that such exemplary awards run contrary to the
intent of IDEA. An examination of the case law synthesized with
IDEA's legislative history will show that punitive damages conflict
with the goals and purposes of IDEA and should be prohibited.
IV. Disagreement over Section 1415(e)(2)'s Interpretation
A. The Era Before the Supreme Court's Decision in School
Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education of
Massachusetts
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in School Committee of
Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts,77 which
stated that courts possess broad discretion in fashioning appropriate
relief, 78 courts varied in awarding relief under the Act; some
71. Id. § 3.11(11).
72. James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has
Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1154 (1984) ("astronomical figures that boggle
the mind").
73. See John D. Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV.
870, 885 (1976).
74. DOBBS, supra note 58, § 3.11(15) (citing Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210,
1240 (Kan. 1987) (The threat of punitive damages destroyed hundreds of allegedly
incriminating documents rather than inform women that the Dalkon Shield was a "bacterial
time bomb" that could induce septic abortions and even death.)).
75. Id. § 3.11(15).
76. Id.
77. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
78. Id. at 369-71.
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courts even refrained from awarding monetary damages. 79  In
Marvin H. v. Austin Independent School District,'° parents of an
emotionally disturbed child filed suit against the school district for
failing to identify their son as a disabled child. This oversight
allegedly denied him a free and appropriate education in violation
of the Act.8" In response, the parents sought a declaratory
judgment that the school district had discriminated against their son
on the basis of a disability.8 2 They also sought restitution for
various expenses incurred for having to resort to private school-
ing.83 However, the Fifth Circuit Court ruled that the Act merely
authorized prospective relief and that any damage remedy
contravened the Statute's goals.8'
The court also stated that the term "appropriate relief," as
stated in the Act, did not encompass punitive damages when
another section of the Act already addresses a state's failure to
comply with the Act.85 Namely, federal funds for the program are
suspended when a state violates the Act's mandates. 6 This
diversion of funds serves as punishment in itself. Thus, the court
stated that any additional punishment in the form of punitive
damages merely results in the imposition of heightened expenses
and a needless diversion of funds from the primary goal of
educating disabled children.'
B. The Burlington Decision
Reflecting on the types of remedies available pursuant to the
Act, the Supreme Court, in 1985, determined that the ordinary
meaning of the language, which directs a court to "grant such relief
as [it] determines is appropriate" confers "broad discretion" on the
79. Valerie J. v. Derry Co-op. Sch. Dist., 771 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1991) (damage
remedies are not consistent with the goals of the Act); Waterman ex. rel. Waterman v.
Marquette-Alger Intermediate Sch. Dist., 739 F. Supp. 361 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (under no
circumstances are monetary damages recoverable under E.A.H.C.A.). But see Brown ex. rel
Brown v. Wilson County Sch. Bd., 747 F. Supp. 436 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (Like retroactive
reimbursement, compensatory education is necessary to preserve a child's fight to a free
education and to prevent parents from having to fund education during litigation.).
80. 714 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1983).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1356.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Marvin H., 714 F.2d at 1356 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1416).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1355-57.
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court" and involves equitable considerations in fashioning re-
lief.89 In exercising its broad discretion, the Court ordered the
Burlington school district to reimburse parents of a disabled child
for expenses they incurred when they were effectively forced to
send their child to a private school.90 Because the public school
system failed to provide their son with an adequate education, the
Court awarded damages accordingly.9 The Court emphasized
that awards are appropriate, within the confines of the Act, if they
further the establishment of a free and appropriate public educa-
tion with an emphasis on special education and related services.
92
Furthermore, the Court noted the appropriateness of a reimburse-
ment award is that it merely requires a school district to belatedly
pay expenses that it should have paid from the start in providing a
proper Individualized Education Program
93 ("I.E.P."). 94
Despite the violations of section 1415(e)(3), 95 which resulted
in the parents placing their child in another school without the
school board's consent, the Court declined to make the parents
choose between leaving a child in a potentially inappropriate
educational placement and sacrificing any claim for reimburse-
ment.96 If parents and school officials disagree with the adequacy
88. School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369-71
(1985).
89. Id. at 374.
90. Id. at 369.
91. Id. at 370. The Court also interpreted "appropriate relief" to encompass injunctive
relief. Due to the lengthy nature of administrative and judicial reviews, the Court felt it
unfair to unnecessarily delay a child's placement or change of placement. Id. at 373.
92. Id. at 370.
93. See supra note 46.
94. School Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71. This type of post hoc financial
responsibility was contemplated in the legislative history:
If a parent contends that he or she has been forced, at that parent's own expense,
to seek private schooling for the child because an appropriate program does not
exist within the local educational agency responsible for the child's education and
the local educational agency disagrees, that disagreement and the question of who
remains financially responsible is a matter to which the due process procedures
established under [the predecessor to § 14151 [apply].
Id. at 371 (quoting S. Rep. No. 168, supra note 12, at 1432).
95. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) provided that: "During the pendency of any proceedings
conducted pursuant to [§ 1415], unless the State or local educational agency and parents or
guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then current educational placement
of such child ...." Thus, the parents in Burlington contravened the conditional command
of this section by changing their son's placement after the administrative proceedings had
been set in motion. School Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 371-72.
96. School Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372.
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of a child's program, the school will not likely agree to a private
school placement while the review process runs its course.97 The
Court emphasized that under the Act, disabled children were
intended to have both an appropriate and a free education. Thus,
cutting off parental rights to reimbursement due to violations of
section 1415(e)(3) conflicts with and defeats the objectives of the
Act.98 Emphasizing that the Act is intended to provide appropri-
ate education to disabled children, the Court refused to recognize
a parental violation of section 1415(e)(3) as a waiver of reimburse-
ment expenses.99 Because of the importance of quality education,
the Court reimbursed the parents who attempted to find their child
a quality educational program. Since Burlington, courts have
adopted this liberal approach to awarding monetary damages and
even have awarded punitive damages for violations of IDEA.
C. The Post-Burlington Era
After Burlington, courts awarded punitive damages under the
Act more frequently. In Woods v. New Jersey Department of
Education,1°° the parents brought an action on behalf of their
daughter who possessed disabilities ranging from communication
and learning problems to an obsessive compulsive disorder.11
The parents alleged that the New Jersey Department of Education
failed to provide their daughter with an appropriate placement and
corresponding program.1" In an effort to restore the eleven
years that their daughter was denied a "free appropriate educa-
tion," the parents sought $605,000 from the New Jersey Depart-
ment of Education and punitive damages from the school
board.1 3 Even though 42 U.S.C. § 1983 grants immunity to
municipalities, 1 4 the parents possessed a private cause of action
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. However, the Court noted that parents who violate § 1415(e)(3) by unilaterally
changing their child's placement during pendent review proceedings do so at their own
financial risk. If a court ultimately determines that the child's placement was not proper,
reimbursement for the interim placement will be barred. Id. at 373-74.
100. 796 F. Supp. 767 (D.N.J. 1992).
101. Id. at 770.
102. Id. at 771. The parents also contended that the school board never provided them
with information concerning their rights as parents of a disabled child. Id.
103. Id. The parents alleged that the negligence of the New Jersey Department of
Education and the school board irreparably harmed their daughter, resulting in her inability
to become independent and capable of supporting herself in the future. Id.
104. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
[Vol. 100:2
PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER IDEA
under IDEA. Because this cause of action permits the court to
"grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate,"1 5 the .court
agreed that the broad discretion announced in Burlington included
the power to award punitive damages."°
The First Circuit interpreted broad discretion to include
punitive damages. In Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Systems"°7 the
court equated the Occupational Safety and Health Act's provision
granting "all appropriate relief" to the authorization of an award
of exemplary or punitive damages."°  Although other statutes
make express references to punitive damages in accordance with
appropriate relief, the court concluded that such references were
immaterial and exemplary damages were nevertheless impliedly
permissible." For instance, the court noted that 42 U.S.C.
§ 5851 protects whistleblowers in nuclear facilities from discrimina-
tion and discharge and provides in relevant part that "[t]he district
courts shall have jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief
including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, compensatory relief,
and exemplary damages."' ° Even though IDEA's section 1415-
(E)(2) fails to make such specific references to exemplary damages,
the court refused to read IDEA so narrowly."n
Courts have rejected the notion that a statute can impliedly
prohibit punitive damages and, therefore, conclude that IDEA's
section 1415(e)(2) permits punitive damages.1 2  Since Burling-
ton's ruling that courts possess broad discretion in fashioning relief
under IDEA, courts now interpret section 1415(e)(2)'s appropriate
relief as encompassing an award of punitive damages. However,
regardless of one's interpretation of broad discretion in fashioning
105. Woods, 796 F. Supp. at 776 (citing School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of
Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985)).
106. See School Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369-71.
107. 26 F.3d 1187 (1st Cir. 1994).
108. Id. at 1194.
109. Id. at 1190-94.
110. Id. at 1191 (emphasis added) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5851). The court cites other
statutes that expressly provide for punitive damages: 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(4) ("Safety of
Public Water Systems") ("Grant all appropriate relief including, but not limited to, injunctive
relief, compensatory, and exemplary damages."); 15 U.S.C. § 2622 ("Toxic Substances" )
("District courts shall have jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief, including injunctive
relief and compensatory and exemplary damages."); 42 U.S.C. § 7622(d) ("Air Pollution")
(Courts may grant "all appropriate relief including, but not limited to, injunctive relief,
compensatory, and exemplary damages."). Id. at 1191-92.




awards, critics question the appropriateness and necessity of
awarding punitive damages under IDEA.
V. Punitive Damages Should Be Precluded Under IDEA
A. Other Areas of the Law Prohibit Punitive Damages
Although the Supreme Court ruled in School Committee of
Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts"' that
courts have broad discretion in fashioning relief, awarding punitive
damages under IDEA runs contrary to practices in other areas of
the law. For instance, plaintiffs in breach of contract actions are
prohibited from collecting punitive damages unless specifically
authorized under the Uniform Commercial Code or common
law." 4  Courts award contract remedies for the purposes of
compensation, not punishment. This rationale upholds the
principle that one should be allowed to breach a contract as long
as the breaching party rightfully restores the non-breaching
party.'
15
Not unlike these contracts, the procedural safeguards of IDEA
intend to compensate, not punish. For example, courts may award
compensatory damages to reimburse parents for expenses incurred
in placing their child in another school. '16 This award promotes
IDEA's purpose of providing a free and appropriate education.
However, punitive damages fall short of promoting a free and
appropriate education. They do not directly serve or further the
plaintiff's pursuit of education, and consequently, they fail to
further congressional objectives.
This prohibition of punitive damages also extends into other
areas of the law. For instance, arbitration tribunals discourage
punitive damage awards and agreements that authorize punitive
damages."7 Similarly, punitive damages are often precluded in
wrongful death actions. Although some states permit punitive
113. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
114. Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (punitive damages not
allowed for a simple breach of contract).
115. Id. (holding that breaches of contract do not inflict discomfort in the same manner
as do wrongs in crimes and torts).
116. School Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71; see supra note 83 and accompany-
ing text.
117. DOBBS, supra note 58, § 3.11(15) (citing Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assoc., Inc., 698 P.2d
880 (N.M. 1985); Richard P. Hackett, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: The Search for a
Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 272 (1978)).
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damages in such cases, n 8 many refuse on the grounds that a
wrongful death statute only grants compensatory relief n 9 While
IDEA does not articulate specific types of remedies, one may
analogize the remedies available under IDEA and conclude that it
impliedly prohibits punitive damages. One may even argue that an
examination of IDEA's statutory construction and legislative
purpose impliedly prohibits punitive damages.
B. Statutory Construction and Legislative Purpose Fail To
Authorize Punitive Damages
1. Statutory Construction.- The statutory construction of
the Lanham Trademark Act of 19461" indirectly reinforces the
exclusion of punitive damages under IDEA's procedural safeguards.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether punitive
damages may be imposed against a trademark infringer, the Second
Circuit in Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum Corp.121
ruled that the Lanham Act implicitly excludes an award of punitive
damages. The Getty court stated that the Lanham Act was
intended "to protect the public so it may buy a product bearing a
particular trademark with confidence that it will get the product it
wants and to protect the holder of the mark's investment in time
and money from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.' ' "2
The court in Getty emphasized that such "[s]tatutory construc-
tion must begin with the language employed by Congress and the
assumption that the ordinary meaning of the language accurately
expresses the legislative purpose."" a  Thus, "absent a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." 4 Accordingly, the court
in Getty examined section 35 of the Lanham Act, which provides
that when there is a violation of a mark registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office, the registrant shall recover: "(1) defendant's
profits; (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff; and (3) the costs
118. DOBBS, supra note 58, § 3.11(15).
119. Id.
120. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128. (1988).
121. 858 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989).
122. Id. at 105 (emphasis added).
123. Park 'n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (interpreting
the Lanham Act provision).
124. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
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of the action."" Furthermore, the court shall use its discretion
to ensure that the amount awarded is just, according to the circum-
stances of each case.' 26 Section 35 provides that such sums "shall
constitute compensation and not a penalty., 127 Because punitive
damages are not mentioned in the statutory recovery scheme for
infringement of a registered mark, the Second Circuit concluded
that Congress never intended to allow for punitive damages as a
remedy."2
Although IDEA does not expressly prohibit punitive damages,
an examination similar to that of the Lanham Act reveals that
section 1415(e)(2) impliedly prohibits punitive damages. Section
1415 implements procedural safeguards to assure that disabled
children are given a free and appropriate education,129 but not
punitive damages.13 Even though the Burlington decision grant-
ed courts "broad discretion" to determine what constitutes
appropriate relief, the decision dealt with compensatory, not
exemplary damages. 3' Thus, given the language of section 1415
and the limited holding of Burlington, one can conclude that
punitive damages were not contemplated by Congress and should
not be encompassed within the Act. If Congress had intended
"appropriate relief" to encompass such exemplary damages, it
would have constructed a provision similar to the provision for
attorney's fees.
132
The Getty decision supports this notion that awards that are
not ordinarily recoverable are impliedly prohibited. The Getty
court analyzed punitive damages in light of Fleischmann Distilling
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co."' In Fleischmann, the court ruled
that reasonable attorney fees were not available under the Lanham
Act because, at the time, section 35 of the Act failed to enumerate
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Getty Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d at 109.
129. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a).
130. Some individuals even argue that by allowing recovery of attorney's fees, IDEA
plaintiffs will negotiate less and sue more. Parents will cease putting a good faith effort into
compromising and merely take the school district to court. Sabrina Eaton, Disabled Act
Causes Litigation Woes, PLAIN DEALER, July 23, 1994, at 6A.
131. School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 370-71
(1985); see supra notes 91 and 94.
132. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B); see supra note 54.
133. 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
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them as an available remedy."4 The court reasoned that because
"attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable," the statute forbids
such an award.135 Eight years later, Congress specifically ad-
dressed this situation and amended section 35 to state that "[t]he
court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party.",116  Thus, the Getty court concluded that
judicially created remedies in the absence of express statutory
language exceed the boundaries of a statute. 37
The court in Getty further stipulated that absent express
statutory authority, punitive damages are not ordinarily recoverable
in equity."8 Originally under the Lanham Act, equity precluded
any monetary relief "'where an injunction will satisfy the equities
of the case' and where 'there has been no showing of fraud or
palming off."'139 Awarding damages under the principles of equity
"scarcely can be used to support the imposition of punitive damag-
es. ''140 Applying this rationale to IDEA, one may argue that
equity similarly precludes an award of punitive damages. Because
the Burlington Court articulated that "equitable considerations are
relevant in fashioning relief"1 41 and that equity normally prohibits
exemplary awards, punitive damages should be barred from the
realm of IDEA.
This bar should be upheld even if violations of the Act are
deliberate. The court in Getty stated that the Lanham Act still
does not authorize an additional award of punitive damages for
intentional infringements of a registered trademark. 42 Although
compensatory damages can serve as a deterrent, the Getty court
134. Id. at 721.
135. Id. at 717.
136. Getty Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d at 109 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1117).
137. See id. at 112. The court was unpersuaded by other circuits that have approved
punitive damages as a Lanham Act remedy if punitive damages were authorized under state
law. See id (citing Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1024 (9th
Cir. 1985) (California law allowed punitive damages), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986)).
138. Id. at 111 (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Labs., 155 F.2d 59, 63 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 773 (1946)).
139. Id. (citing Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 433 F.2d 686, 706-07 (2d Cir.
1970) (quoting Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 905 (1971))).
140. Id. at 112.
141. School Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374 (emphasis added).
142. See also Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)




emphasized the remedial, as opposed to the punitive, nature of the
Lanham Act. 43 Despite an occasional award of punitive damages
in extreme circumstances, as when a defendant continually violates
a court injunction by selling infringing products,1" the Lanham
Act effectively bars punitive damages. The Getty court emphasized
that while it enjoined an exemplary award, the ruling by no means
encourages willful or deliberate trademark infringement.145 As
with the Lanham Act, IDEA was not designed as a channel for
punishment, and so any intentional violations should not invoke
punitive damages, whether under an examination of the aforemen-
tioned statutory construction or the following legislative purpose.
2. Legislative Purpose.- In addition to an analysis of
statutory construction, an examination of IDEA's legislative intent
supports the prohibition of punitive damages. By awarding
punitive damages, the courts merely rob a school district of already
scarce funds and provide a windfall to the plaintiff." This
outcome frustrates and defeats IDEA's goals which include: (1)
distributing funds to the states; (2) assuring priority in delivery of
services to disabled children; (3) providing early identification and
assessment; (4) providing procedural protections for parents and
guardians; and (5) solving erroneous classification and labeling of
disabled children. 47 Congress shaped the Act to make and
improve public educational programs for disabled children, not to
provide cushions for plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, if courts choose to cushion a plaintiff's financial
status without regard to the goals of the Act, it will be at the
public's expense. Ultimately, the cost of punitive damages will be
passed onto the public in the form of higher taxes.1" With this
consideration, it is doubtful that Congress intended to provide such
havens for plaintiffs.
143. Getty Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d at 113.
144. E.g., Hain Pure Food Co. v. Sona Food Products Co., 49 F. Supp. 39 (C.D. Cal.
1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 910 (1982).
145. Getty Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d at 113.
146. Marvin H. v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983). The
federal funds granted under the Act were by no means to be used for anything other than
the education of disabled children. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 12, at 1456.
147. Id. at 1437-38.
148. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 265-67 (1981).
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C. Punitive Damages Punish the Innocent Taxpayer, Not the
School Board
Even though IDEA's statutory language and legislative history
indicate a presumption against punitive damages, it is argued that
punitive damages hurt not only the school district but the innocent
taxpayer as well. To understand this argument, it may by helpful
to first turn to the landmark case of City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc.,"' wherein the Supreme Court determined that
municipalities enjoyed immunity from punitive damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.'50 The Court in Newport explained that under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, a federal remedy was available against a
person who, acting under the color of state law, deprived another
of his constitutional rights.'5' Likewise, the Court explained that
the enactment of section 1983 permitted a municipality, like a
private corporation, to be treated as a natural person and to be
liable for a wide range of tortious activity.12 Congress, however,
expressed no intention to do away with the common law immuni-
ties from punitive damages afforded to state officials at the time
section 1983 was enacted. 53 Thus, municipalities continued to be
insulated from punitive damages.
The Supreme Court specified in Newport that the imposition
of punitive damages would unfairly punish innocent taxpayers for
the deeds of persons over whom they had no control,'-' and
would place an immense and unmanageable financial burden on
local governments.'55 The Court explained that punitive damages
by definition do not compensate the plaintiff, rather they punish
and deter an individual whose wrongful action was intentional or
malicious.'56 Punitive damages against a municipality, however,
merely punish taxpayers who play no part in the commission of the
149. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
150. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
151. Id. at 258 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)).
152. Id. at 259. The Court held for the first time in Monell v. New York City
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that a local government could be subject
to suit as a "person" within the confines of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
153. City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 259.
154. Id at 266.
155. Id at 265.
156. Id. at 266-67.
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tort.157 Therefore, punitive damages fail to sensibly charge the
governmental unit itself.
Similarly, taxpayers bear the financial burden of punitive
damages under IDEA. Instead of having a deterrent effect on
school boards, these costs simply lead to a levy of additional school
taxes upon innocent citizens. Moreover, the Act already provides
deterrent measures without punitive damages. Under IDEA, a
state's failure to comply with mandatory guidelines results in a
suspension of federal funds.58 This diversion of funds, in and of
itself, constitutes a form of punishment and should not be increased
by an award of punitive damages.
159
Additionally, the Newport Court questioned the deterrent
effect of punitive damages. The Court reasoned that punitive
damages cannot be justified by a deterrence rationale. Municipal
officials will not likely refrain from wrongdoing simply because
substantial punitive awards could be assessed against the municipal-
ity.1" Even if indemnification were not available to individuals
acting under color of law, officials would not likely have the
resources to pay sizable punitive awards.
1 61
Thus, if the public mandates additional protection against a
school district's wrongdoings, it can vote the wrongdoers out of
office.162 If a plaintiff dislikes the workings of a school board, a
cause of action lies with the ballot box. Punitive damages merely
serve to increase the plaintiff's income at the expense of tax payers
and quality educational programming. School districts already
incur significant financial burdens without the added expense of
punitive damages.
D. IDEA Already Imposes Significant Financial Burdens
Although IDEA grants federal funds to participating states and
school districts, educating disabled children poses significant
financial burdens."6 IDEA requires that a school provide a con-
glomeration of services depending upon a child's disabilities and
157. Id. at 267.
158. Marvin H. v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing 20
U.S.C. § 1416).
159. Id.
160. City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 269.
161. Id. at 268.
162. Id.
163. See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361, 366 (1993).
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needs. These services can include, among other things, special
teachers, special computers or appliances, and special classes to
assist the child with a school subject."6 These extra costs, which
can run thousands of dollars per student, 65 should not be height-
ened by the imposition of often arbitrary and excessive punitive
awards.
The severity of these implications has been recognized by the
Supreme Court. In Newport, the Court explained that it would be
a serious risk to the financial integrity of governmental entities to
hold individual government employees liable for punitive damages.
Because people perceive municipalities as possessing an unlimited
power to tax, the Court recognized that juries would return with
sizable punitive awards against municipalities.1" Such sizable
awards, the Court noted would place a "strain on local treasuries
and therefore on services available to the public at large.
167
Similarly, punitive damages would strain a school's budget.
Contrary to IDEA's objectives, punitive damages would divert
excessive funds from the Act's primary goal of educating disabled
children."6 Rather than investing in educational resources, a
school district may be forced to "pay off" punitive liabilities.
Considerations of history and policy, therefore, do not favor an
award of punitive damages.
E. Supreme Court's Conservative Stance on Punitive Damages
Without regard to the Act and its legislative intent, the
Supreme Court, takes a conservative stance on punitive damages.
Acknowledging that punitive damages pose a serious danger of
arbitrary deprivations of property, the Supreme Court recently
recognized the necessity of a substantive limit on the size of
punitive damages.169 Most notably, the Court stated that "[o]ne
must concede that unlimited jury discretion ... in the fixing of
164. Law Allows Learning Disabilities Test, NEWS AND RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), July
29, 1994, at BG4.
165. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1402 (9th Cir. 1994).
166. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270 (1981) (citing Electrical
Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-
50 (1974)).
167. Id. at 271.
168. Marvin H. v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983).
169. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2337-38 (1994). A jury usually
possesses wide discretion in selecting the amount of punitive damages. Id.
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punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's
constitutional sensibilities." 170
These constitutional concerns were addressed in Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip171 and TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp.172 In both of these opinions, the Court
stressed the importance of the procedural component of the Due
Process Clause. Both decisions indicated that the Due Process
Clause imposes an outer limit on punitive damages, but neither
decision specified any criteria for creating such limits. In Haslip,
the Court emphasized "meaningful and adequate review by the trial
court" and subsequent appellate review,173 but failed to "draw a
mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable
and the constitutionally unacceptable."174 Similarly in TXO, the
majority agreed that grossly excessive punitive damages violate the
Due Process Clause.175  Thus, while the Court recognized the
problem in both cases, it failed to articulate a solution.
The Court's concerns regarding punitive damages are also
evident in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg176  The Court in Honda
ruled that Oregon's denial of review of the size of punitive damage
awards violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause7 7 Although the Due Process Clause says nothing about
arbitrary grants of freedom, its entire purpose contemplates the
prevention of arbitrary deprivations of property or liberty.78
Thus, the Supreme Court will be quick to disregard arbitrary and
inaccurate adjudications in violation of Due Process. 79  There-
fore, even when a complaint contains a limitation on punitive
damages, a pre-verdict determination of maximum allowable
170. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
171. Id.
172. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
173. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 499 U.S. at 20.
174. Id. at 18.
175. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2718-19.
176. 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
177. Id. at 2339-40. In Honda, the jury awarded respondent Oberg $5,000,000 in punitive
damages, more than five times the amount of his compensatory damages award. Although
the Oregon State Court of Appeals and the State Supreme Court found that the award did
not violate due process, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Oregon's denial of
review violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
178. Id. at 2339-40.
179. Id. at 2340 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
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punitive damages, and descriptive jury instructions," the jury
may nevertheless return a "lawless, biased, or arbitrary ver-
dict." '181 To protect against such arbitrary awards, the Court,
reinforcing its conservative bias against punitive damages, ruled
that every state must foster and promote appellate review of
punitive damages.182
This mandate that every state implement a review of punitive
damages reveals the Court's reservations concerning punitive
damages as well as its general disapproval of punitive damage
awards. Accordingly, it is likely that the Court would disfavor
punitive damages under IDEA, particularly when punitive damages
pose a threat to quality education. If exemplary awards are
whimsical and erratic,"s they have no practical purpose within the
confines of an Act intended to provide a free and appropriate
education for disabled children. Uncertainty as to the amount of
punitive damages threatens a system currently pressed for funds.
Moreover, diverting resources from the school district in the form
of punitive damages provides no return of capital for educational
purposes. Such a diversion could even throw school systems back
into the financial distress they experienced prior to the enactment
of IDEA."s  Given these vices, it is doubtful that the Court
would endorse punitive damages pursuant to IDEA.
VI. Whether Public or Private, Education for Disabled Children
Is Expensive, but Must Be Preserved
The ability to provide a free and appropriate education for
disabled children, whether public or private, depends upon a
school's budget. Yet, punitive damage awards place additional
burdens on these budgets when resources for education are already
scarce. As this section will explain, the demands on schools are
many. Regardless of whether a child attends a private school or a
public school and goes to a regular or a special class, ample
180. Id. at 2341.
181. Honda Motor Co., 114 S. Ct. at 2341. The Court recognized a punitive damages
study revealing that over half of all punitive damage awards are appealed, and that over half
of those appealed result in reversals or reductions. Id. at 2341 n.11.
182. Id. at 2341.
183. DOBBS, supra note 58, § 3.11(15).
184. Mills v. Board of Educ. of the District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C.




resources are necessary to educate that child adequately. The
following discussion highlights the debate surrounding the inclusion
of disabled children in a regular classroom and the financial impact
of educating disabled children and awarding punitive damages.
Under IDEA, states that receive federal funding must ensure
that children with disabilities are educated with non-disabled
children in regular classrooms "to the maximum extent appropri-
ate."'85  This integration concept, commonly known as "main-
streaming" or "inclusion," emphasizes the utilization of support
services and supplementary aids within the regular classroom.86
The Third Circuit in Oberti v. Board of Education interpreted
IDEA's mainstreaming requirement as to prohibit a school from
taking a child out of a satisfactory regular classroom and placing
him into a special school or classroom."s  A school may also
violate IDEA if it fails to exert sufficient efforts to include the
child in regular school programs."' Courts frequently refer to
this mainstreaming mandate as placement in the "least restrictive
environment."1
89
In addition to requiring a free and appropriate education,
IDEA also provides that states must establish
procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate,
children with disabilities ... are educated with children who are
not disabled, and that special classes, separate schooling, or
other removal of children with disabilities from the educational
environment occurs only when the nature and severity of the
disability is such that education in regular classes with the use
of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfac-
torily.I9°
However, the court in Oberti recognized that regular classes cannot
possibly provide an education that accommodates the particular
needs of each and every child. 9' Thus, IDEA's mainstreaming
185. Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1206 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(5)(B)).
186. Id. at 1207 n.1. Mainstreaming or inclusion allegedly work best when special
education and regular teachers work together as teams in the classrooms. See Nancy Weil,
Handicapped Students at Issue in Negotiations, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at P1.
187. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1204.
188. Id. at 1207.
189. Id. at 1209 n.6 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.550-56; Greer v. Rome City School Dist., 950
F.2d 688, 698 (11th Cir. 1991)).
190. Id. at 1213 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B)).
191. Id. at 1214.
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requirement creates tension by requiring schools to formulate
individualized programs tailored to the unique needs of each
disabled child. 92 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit Court in Oberti
emphasized the benefits of mainstreaming 93 and noted that the
Act does not permit schools to make mere token gestures in order
to accommodate disabled students.'94 The court concluded that
disabled children who merely require more teacher attention will
not severely disrupt the learning process of other regular stu-
dents.195
On the other hand, while inclusion supposedly accommodates
all children by providing them with an opportunity to learn and
socialize with people different from themselves, critics argue that
mainstreaming detracts from the learning environment. 96 Inclu-
sion requires too many resources to achieve success in a majority
of districts. For instance, the resources employed in a successfully
mainstreamed class may include: curriculum modifications, adapted
equipment, computers and software, special tutoring, frequent
meetings of the child's individualized education plan team, class-
room aides, and even interpreters.197 While these changes assist
children in the educational process, these resources are costly and
stretch the budget.
With respect to this mainstreaming, a recent survey indicated
that ninety-eight percent of parents of learning-disabled children
believe that general educators lack the credentials to instruct their
children, and many teachers agreed. 98 Only fifty-three percent
of the regular teachers polled felt qualified enough to teach such
192. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1204.
193. Id. To establish the importance of mainstreaming, the court relied on the following
cases: Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991) (language and role
modeling from association with non-disabled peers are essential benefits of mainstreaming);
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1989) ("A child may be able
to absorb only a minimal amount of the regular education program, but may benefit
enormously from the language models that his nonhandicapped peers provide."); Board of
Educ. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 882 (E.D. Cal. 1992)
(benefits obtained by child with mental retardation as a result of placement in a regular
classroom include development of social and communications skills and generally improved
self-esteem). Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1209.
194. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1216.
195. Id. at 1217.
196. Inclusion: Good for Students, or Simply P.C., AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK,
INC., DAILY REP. CARD, Sept. 12, 1994.
197. Id.
198. Tamara Henry, Teaching Learning Disabled, USA TODAY, Sept. 22, 1994, at 8D.
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students.199 Schools then face significant burdens in attempting
to accommodate disabled children. Given these facts, critics also
contend that denying a child education apart from the regular
classroom "deprives the handicapped of their most valuable asset
- the recognition of their disability by the rest of us."'  Thus,
while some parents and teachers applaud mainstreaming as
providing normalcy to all children, others criticize it as cruel and
disruptive for everyone.
Regardless of whether one advocates public mainstreaming or
separate and private instruction, IDEA mandates that all disabled
children receive a free and appropriate education. In February of
1994, the National Organization on Disability's Survey of Ameri-
cans with Disabilities indicated that disabled individuals have
achieved significant improvements in educational levels and that
thousands of individuals have benefitted from the passage of
IDEA. 1 The results showed that while only three in five disabled
adults completed at least a high school education in 1986, as many
as three in four disabled adults had completed the same in
1994.2' Additionally, the encouraging findings showed that the
proportion of adults with disabilities who have completed some
college training nearly mirrors the non-disabled population.2 3
The survey also suggested, however, that most Americans with
disabilities have tremendous difficulties when attempting "to cross
the mainstream, to be more fully accepted, and to enjoy a reason-
ably full and happy life."2" Mainstreaming disabled children into
society requires appropriate education. Therefore, logic dictates
that IDEA's "appropriate relief" include compensatory damages,
such as retroactive reimbursement when a school district fails to
provide adequate education. School districts that fall short of
providing such an education should reimburse parents for expenses
incurred in attempting to find their child such an education.2 5
This scheme also provides special protection for plaintiffs who are
199. Id.
200. Inclusion: Good for Students, or Simply P.C., supra note 196.
201. Humphrey Taylor, Mixed Results for Laws Aimed at Disabled, GANNETT NEWS
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[Vol. 100:2
PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER IDEA
too poor to obtain private instruction if a school district fails to
provide a free and appropriate education.2° 6
No such correlation exists, however, with respect to punitive
damages. Punitive damages qualify as quasi-criminal punishment
in a civil suit and merely provide a windfall to the plaintiff.'
When a plaintiff receives compensatory damages, the necessity for
this windfall disappears.2" s Under IDEA, courts should deny
miscellaneous requests for relief not directly tied to a child's
education. Congress established IDEA as a means to provide
disabled children with a free and appropriate education and
corresponding procedural safeguards, not a haven for plaintiffs to
obtain monetary windfalls.
VII. Conclusion
Because the problems and concerns that have historically
surrounded punitive damages also plague IDEA, "appropriate
relief' should be interpreted to preclude exemplary damages.
IDEA focuses on educating disabled children to the maximum
extent appropriate,' not providing windfalls to plaintiffs. If
courts award punitive damages, they will rob schools of precious
funds needed to provide these children with an appropriate
education. This diversion of funds frustrates the Act's intention to
provide education to disabled children.2 0 Diverting funds from
the primary goal of education is not what Congress intended when
it enacted IDEA.2"
Even though the Supreme Court in School Committee of
Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts212 ruled
that courts possess "broad discretion" in fashioning relief under
IDEA,2 13 this decision focused on awarding reimbursement
expenses and failed to address the policy implications of awarding
exemplary damages. Several areas of the law prohibit punitive
damages on the basis that they run contrary to public welfare.2"4
206. Mills v. Board of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 870 (D.D.C. 1972).
207. Loughry v. Lincoln First Bank, 494 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 1986).
208. Marvin H. v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1983).
209. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 12, at 1430.
210. Id. at 1456.
211. Marvin H., 714 F.2d at 1356.
212. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).




An examination of the Act's language further reveals that if
Congress had meant for courts to award punitive damages, it would
have constructed such a provision, 2 5 as it did with the creation of
a special section for attorney's fees. 216 Such specifications should
be made where equity normally prohibits such awards of punitive
damages.
217
Additionally, punitive damages simply yield a monetary
windfall for plaintiffs at the public's expense. Taxpayers typically
bear the cost of punitive damages in the form of higher taxes.
218
These awards also drain the school of precious resources.
219
Courts often associate punitive damages with arbitrary deprivations
of property,220 even if the court possesses the power to review
such awards.22 Because punitive damages pose such threats to
the educational system, they should be eliminated. IDEA
generated significant improvements in the area of educating
disabled children, and these improvements should be encouraged
to continue well into the future.222 Because punitive damages fail
to contribute to such progress, courts should avoid any award of
punitive damages.
However, if courts refuse to eradicate punitive damages from
the confines of IDEA, other alternatives may prevail. For instance,
instead of awarding exemplary damages to an individual plaintiff,
courts could distribute funds specifically earmarked for special
educational purposes to another public entity. Congress could also
create a "bright line" formula so as to create a cap on damages.
Such a formula might solve the subjectiveness of punitive damages.
Finally, courts could require a high burden of proof. In this
manner, plaintiffs would have to firmly establish malice or
wrongdoing on behalf of the defendant. Nevertheless, these
proposed solutions fall short of providing a perfect answer. With
respect to IDEA, the prohibition of punitive damages provides the
only real solution. Otherwise, punitive damages will continue to fly
215. Contra Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., 26 F.3d 1187, 1191-93 (1st Cir. 1994)
(disregarding the need for statutes to expressly provide for punitive damages).
216. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B).
217. School Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374.
218. Marvin H., 714 F.2d at 1356.
219. Id.
220. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2340-41 (1994).
221. Id.
222. Taylor, supra note 201.
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in the face of the Act by contradicting the primary goals and
objectives of Congress.
Stephanie L. Gill

